Lebanon: The Forgotten Proof That the Arab-Israeli Conflict Was Never About Land
When Greater Lebanon was established in 1920 under French mandate, its Sunni Muslims population, from Tripoli to Beirut to the southern coast, rejected it immediately. Their objection was not rooted in colonial grievances or stolen land; the territory was undeniably Arab, its population indigenous. What they rejected was Lebanon’s audacity to organize itself outside of Islamic political supremacy. Lebanon’s framework was Christian-led, pluralistic, and distinct from the Islamic order that had ruled the region for centuries under the Ottoman caliphate. From the start, Lebanon’s existence was seen as an ideological rebellion, not a territorial dispute.[1]
Proclamation of Greater Lebanon in Beirut, c.1920.
This same rejection would later target Israel. A Jewish state asserting sovereignty on historically Muslim-ruled land was, like Lebanon, treated as an intolerable rupture in the established ideological order. In both cases, the response was identical: delegitimize, undermine, destroy. Lebanon was a bold experiment: a multi-sectarian state where Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims, Druze, and others would coexist under a shared Lebanese identity. But this vision was never fully embraced. Sunni Muslims, particularly in the coastal cities, continued to see themselves as part of a greater Arab-Islamic nation. They viewed Lebanon’s Christian leadership not as partners, but as betrayers of Arab and Islamic solidarity. Their loyalty remained external, and their rejection of Lebanon’s distinct identity became a permanent internal fracture.
The pattern of compromise began early. In 1948, when Israel declared its independence, Lebanon faced a defining choice: to assert its unique national identity or to submerge itself in Arab nationalist ambitions. It chose the latter. Lebanon joined the Arab war against Israel, not from strength, but from fear of isolation among its Arab neighbors. Its military contribution was minimal, but the political message was devastating: Lebanon would prioritize appeasing external Arab expectations over consolidating its own fragile identity. This decision set a precedent that would haunt Lebanon for decades.
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, Lebanon was swept by Nasserism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Islam. Under the banners of “Arab solidarity” and “social justice,” internal Sunni factions continued to erode the distinctiveness of the Lebanese project. Rather than strengthening the pluralistic state, they worked to dissolve it into the broader Arab-Islamic sphere. Lebanon’s Christian-led framework was increasingly treated as a colonial relic, not as a legitimate national foundation.
The fatal moment arrived in the early 1970s, when Lebanon’s Christian leadership, under mounting internal and external pressure, allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to establish itself in southern Lebanon following its expulsion from Jordan. Hosting the PLO was a catastrophic surrender of sovereignty. Southern Lebanon became a militarized staging ground for attacks against Israel, and the Lebanese state lost effective control over its territory. The country’s identity, already fragile, was now openly hostage to external ideological ambitions.
The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) was the inevitable outcome of years of appeasement. Lebanon collapsed under the weight of internal sectarian rivalries, Palestinian militancy, and the intervention of foreign powers seeking to manipulate the chaos for their own gain. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq funneled money and arms to Palestinian groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and leftist militias, aiming to counter Syrian influence and project Iraqi power. Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya went even further, providing training camps, weapons, and funds to the PLO, the PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and other radical groups.
Palestinian militias, heavily armed and emboldened by Iraqi and Libyan backing, clashed violently with Lebanese Christian factions. Cross-border attacks on Israel provoked devastating Israeli retaliations, culminating in the 1982 Israeli invasion. Lebanon, once envisioned as a pluralistic beacon in the Middle East, was reduced to a fragmented, hollowed-out shell: a country without a coherent identity, without functioning sovereignty, and ultimately, without a future.
Israel faced the same existential rejection, but its response was fundamentally different. Like Lebanon, Israel was seen as a rebellion against Islamic primacy. But unlike Lebanon, Israel refused to bend. From its founding, Israel defended its sovereignty with strength and clarity. It fought alone through the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and beyond. It refused to surrender its Jewish identity for the sake of appeasement. Lebanon’s fate proves the point: its borders were not disputed, its land was not seized, yet it was still targeted for destruction simply because it did not conform to Islamic political supremacy.
The playbook was the same. In Lebanon, internal subversion came through Nasserism, the PLO, and armed militias. In Israel’s case, it came through external wars, terrorism, and an ongoing international campaign to delegitimize its existence. Lebanon bent and was shattered. Israel stood firm and survives.
Intifada 2000
Lebanon’s tragedy is not merely a relic of the past. It is a living warning. Lebanon tried to survive by proving its Arabness, by surrendering its distinctiveness, by accommodating forces that would never accept its right to exist. It hosted foreign armies, fought Arab wars, buried its Christian heritage, and was still destroyed. Israel, by contrast, has survived relentless wars, terrorist assaults, boycotts, and global vilification, yet remains a thriving democracy because it refused to compromise its core identity.
The Arab-Israeli conflict, like the war on Lebanon, has never been about land. It has always been about ideological supremacy: whether free nations are allowed to exist outside the rule of Islamic imperial ideology. Lebanon paid the price for compromise. Israel pays the price for survival. The stakes are not just Lebanon’s past or Israel’s future, they are the future of any nation that dares to assert its right to exist on its own terms.
[1] Historical records confirm that many Sunni Muslims, including elites in coastal cities, opposed the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 because it separated them from Syria, where Sunnis formed a majority, and placed them under a Christian-led state. A 1919 petition from Sunni notables in Beirut and Tripoli demanded integration with a unified Syria under King Faisal, reflecting their preference for an Arab and Islamic political framework over a Lebanese state aligned with French and Maronite interests.
About the Author
DANNY BURMAWI
Danny Burmawi is an Author, speaker, an advocate for religious liberty, and rational thought, a content creator, and social entrepreneur with a passion for transformative media and advocacy.
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